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AT THE END OF THE CLINICAL TRIAL:
DOES ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY END AS WELL?
RICHARD S. SAVER*

Medical research subjects increasingly are demanding (and
litigating about) continued access to investigational technology af
ter the clinical trial has concluded. This Article undertakes a criti
cal review of the legal, ethical, and policy issues that arise in post
trial access disputes. The regulatory and reimbursement objectives
of many key stakeholders affected by the clinical trial testing pro
cess-research subjects, drug companies, device manufacturers, in
vestigators, payers, and regulatory agencies-are not always
aligned, leading to difficult tensions. Post-trial access disputes de
serve greater regulatory and scholarly attention, and remain quite
difficult to resolve, precisely because these distinct stakeholder per
spectives become particularly salient and the differences pragmati
cally all the more important at the end of the clinical trial. A
study'S conclusion is a critical juncture and can become a
flashpoint for general conflict. At the end of a study, many of the
stakeholders have already invested and committed significant re
sources (both personal and financial) to the clinical trial, yet now
may find their expectations for what should happen next abruptly
frustrated or overridden by other interests. This Article considers
the primary legal and ethical arguments, as well as policy consider
ations, for offering subjects greater post-trial access to investiga
tional technology and also explores important reasons for rejecting
such access demands. An incremental reform approach is recom
mended, one that moves beyond the status quo-where subjects
have generally weak rights to post-trial access-yet avoids the dan
gers and possible counterproductive effects of unbounded post
trial access. Two preliminary suggestions are offered to help move
in this direction: (1) requiring more detailed regulatory review of
plans and budgets for post-trial access before clinical trial proto
cols are approved; and (2) providing subjects, in certain situations,
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other benefits as an alternative to continued access to the study
technology.
INTRODUCTION

Investigational medical technology presents difficult questions
for health law and policy regarding access. Patients and health care
providers often want to use experimental drugs, new medical de
vices, and other investigational technology before these products
have completed testing in clinical trials and received final regula
tory approvals for regular clinical care. 1 Indeed, when conventional
treatments are not working, critically ill patients may perceive in
vestigational technology as their only hope. Expanded access re
spects patient and provider autonomy, responds to individual
health needs, and diffuses medical advances more rapidly to clinical
practice. Yet these objectives often run up against equally impor
tant regulatory and population health considerations favoring re
stricted access. Risks to the population are minimized by ensuring
that investigational technology undergoes sufficient safety and effi
cacy testing, usually through formal clinical trials, before the tech
nology is approved for marketing and public distribution. In
addition, unrestricted utilization of still unproven and possibly cost
ineffective technology adds additional cost pressures to a health
care financing system already straining under limited resources.
Until now, access disputes have typically concerned whether
patients must participate in medical research in order to receive in
vestigational technology. Consider the example of experimental
drugs not yet approved for general commercial use by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).2 Under FDA law, pharmaceutical
companies generally cannot supply experimental drugs unless in
connection with clinical trials that are testing the medication and
gathering data for the FDA-approval process. 3 Litigation efforts by
patients to demand non-approved technology outside of a clinical
trial have generally met with limited success, dating from the
See, e.g., Judy Foreman, For Some, Untested Drug Is a Last Chance, BOSTON
Sept. 23, 2003, at C3.
2. Experimental medical devices and other investigational technology are subject
to different regulatory approval procedures and usage rules than experimental drugs.
This discussion uses experimental drugs as an example of the more general pattern of
restricting access to investigational technology outside of a clinical trial.
3. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(b) (2008); see also id. § 312.34 (describing limited oppor·
tunities for "treatment use" of investigational new drugs even when outside of clinical
trial participation).
1.

GLOBE,
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Laetrile battles of earlier decades to the more recent Abigail Alli
ance litigation concerning access to experimental cancer drugs. 4
The other typical access battle involves reimbursement. Even
after investigational medical technology has obtained full regula
tory approval for commercial use and health care providers can le
gally prescribe it in ordinary clinical practice, patients may not have
health care coverage for it. Private health care payers typically ex
clude coverage in their insurance contracts for experimental or
medically unnecessary services; an exclusion that can be applied to
all sorts of investigational and newly approved technology.s Pay
ment rules under governmental health care programs such as Medi
care and Medicaid similarly restrict reimbursement for
investigational technology.6 A great deal of litigation has involved
patients challenging such coverage exclusions.7
This Article concerns a different type of access dispute that has
not received equivalent attention to date, yet is emerging as a con
tinuing problem, especially as the amount of experimentation with
human subjects steadily increases: what should happen at the end of
a clinical trial? Medical research subjects increasingly are demand
ing (and litigating about) continued access to investigational tech
nology after the clinical trial has concluded. s Unfortunately, there
4. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008)
. (Erbitux); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (Laetrile).
5. See Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts
Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1992); see also Rollo v.
Blue CrosslBlue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
(involving a claim against a health insurance plan for an exclusion of experimental
medicine).
6. See 42 U.S.c. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
7. See, e.g., Rollo, 1990 WL 312647. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F.
Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637
(1992); Saver, supra note 5.
8. A related form of access dispute, beyond the scope of this Article, concerns
subjects seeking access to investigational technology during the trial, as opposed to at
the end. During the trial not all participating subjects enjoy access to the investiga
tional technology. In randomized studies, comparing "control" standard treatment
groups against groups receiving the investigational technology, some subjects will be
assigned the standard treatment even when they wanted access to the investigational
technology. This also can lead to access conflict. For example, in Stewart v. Cleveland
Clinic Foundation, 736 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiff was assigned to
the standard treatment arm of a cancer study and received radiation and surgery but no
preoperative chemotherapy (the investigational intervention). The plaintiff sued, rais
ing various informed consent claims including that he had not been told about the pos
sibility of receiving the investigational intervention outside of the clinic trial. An Ohio
appellate court ruled that the plaintiff's informed consent claim was sufficient to survive
summary judgment, but there was no ruling on the merits, and the case eventually set
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does not appear to be a firm consensus regarding how best to
respond to such access demands. Many difficult questions arise for
health law and policy: Do the subjects who participated in the
research have any valid claims, legally or ethically, for continued
access to the study technology? Should they have priority access
over others? Should sponsors and investigators have discretion to
inform subjects during the consent process that the trial may be
terminated at any time and, if so, that there will be no opportunity
for continued access to the investigational technology? If there are
obligations to provide subjects with continued access, are they
borne equally by the clinical investigators, trial sponsors, and medi
cal centers where the research is conducted? And does ensuring
access mean only providing subjects an opportunity to continue re
ceiving the technology or also paying for it?
In some respects, post-trial access disputes are merely new
variations on the more traditional problem of patients demanding
access to investigational technology without participating in a
clinical trial at all. Both types of disputes-post-trial and sans
trial-implicate many common themes: tensions between patient
and provider freedom of choice versus the governmental public
health interest in controlled access and systematic testing; difficul
ties health care payers encounter in deciding whether and when to
reimburse new health care technology of uncertain efficacy, safety,
and cost-effectiveness; and the often unclear distinctions between
truly experimental medicine, innovative therapy, and ordinary
clinical care.
Yet, as this Article explores, post-trial access disputes arise in a
special context, one that provides provocative new perspectives on
the access conundrum. To start, the legal status and reasonable ex
pectations of a clinical trial subject who has already participated in
medical research seem very different from the status and expecta
tions of the ordinary patient. Also, consistent with the general
theme of this symposium-regulation and reimbursement of health
care technology-post-trial access disputes have important, perhaps
somewhat unappreciated, implications regarding oversight and fi
nancing of health care technology.
The clinical trial serves as the primary gateway for new medical
technology to diffuse into general clinical practice. 9 Successful
tied. See id. at 501-02; see also Jerry Menikoff, The Hidden Alternative: Getting Investi
gational Treatments Off-Study, 361 LANCET 63,64,66 (2003).
9. See Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008).
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completion of clinical trial testing is usually required for investiga
tional technology to obtain full regulatory approval,1o Accordingly,
the clinical trial becomes a critical step as a matter of regulation and
reimbursement. From a regulatory perspective, required clinical
trial testing serves a risk management function, ensuring that poten
tially dangerous new technology is monitored and adverse exposure
is limited until better consensus about the technology emerges. 11
From a reimbursement perspective, clinical trial testing generates
preliminary efficacy and (sometimes) cost -effectiveness data, as
sessment information that is quite important to governmental and
private payers deciding whether, and under which conditions, to of
fer coverage for a new medical technologyY However, the regula
tory and reimbursement objectives of the many key stakeholders
affected by the clinical trial testing process-research subjects, drug
companies, device manufacturers, investigators, payers, and regula
tory agencies-are not always aligned, leading to difficult tensions.
Post-trial access disputes are quite difficult to resolve because
these distinct stakeholder perspectives become particularly salient,
and the differences more important, at the end of the clinical trial.
A study's conclusion is a critical juncture and can become a
flashpoint for general conflict and for inconsistent regulatory and
reimbursement agendas to surface. By the end of a study many of
the stakeholders have already invested and committed significant
resources-both personal and financial-to the clinical trial, yet
may find their expectations for what should happen next abruptly
frustrated or overridden by other interests.
For example, after the research study ends, subjects may highly
value continued access to an investigational technology, even if it
seemingly offers only marginal therapeutic improvement.13 Sub
jects who have risked harm or experienced other research-related
burdens for the good of the clinical trial will likely feel entitled to
recoup any possible treatment benefit suggested by the study. But
an investigator may have less regard for subjects' post-trial access
needs and place more value on ensuring that the trial continues to a
10. See id.
11. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("Current law bars public
access to drugs undergoing clinical testing on safety grounds."), cert denied, 128 S. Ct.
1069 (2008).
12. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.
13. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick & Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk,
TIME, Apr. 22, 2002, at 46 (noting that when one clinical trial was terminated for safety
reasons, twelve participants fought to be allowed to continue the trial).
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valid statistical stopping point, or even that altogether new trials are
conducted with different subjects to resolve the research issue
presented to a reasonable degree of scientific acceptability. A
pharmaceutical company sponsoring the clinical trial may also have
less regard for subjects' post-trial access needs and conclude, for
business reasons, such as likely unfavorable reimbursement from
health care payers, that the new technology is no longer worth de
veloping, even if it showed some benefit in the medical study. The
FDA, meanwhile, may focus its regulatory review on whether the
trial data justifies approving the technology for commercial use
with clinical patients generally, as opposed to concern for what hap
pens to individual subjects once a particular trial shuts down.
Despite the important and often conflicting interests impli
cated, post-trial access disputes have generally received insufficient
regulatory and scholarly attention. Part of this is because, as noted,
the more frequent access battles have typically occurred with pa
tients (as opposed to already enrolled research subjects). Also,
long-standing concerns about protecting research subjects from
physical harm, deception, and exploitation have meant that law and
ethics pay a great deal of attention to the beginning stages of a
clinical trial,14 including what goes on in subject recruitment, what
needs to be disclosed during the informed consent process, how
study risks and benefits are evaluated, and how protocols get ini
tially approved. What happens once the trial is over has simply
been much farther off the radar screen. Moreover, to the extent
that post-trial access disputes have attracted attention, much of the
focus has been on international research, including HIV and hepati
tis studies. In these clinical trials, concerns have been raised about
possible exploitation of subjects in developing countries because
the subjects do not have access to the study technology, or afford
able health care more generally, once their study participation
ends. 15 While these subjects will rarely enjoy the benefits of post
14. See generally Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58
V AND. L. REV. 387 (2005); Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in
Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Prac
tice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1986); Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human
Subjects Research: The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EM
ORY LJ. 327 (2003).
15. See, e.g., Christine Grady, The Challenge of Assuring Continued Post- Trial
Access to Beneficial Treatment,S YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 425, 431-32
(2005) (explaining that an HIV prevention study that would have involved almost 1000
Cambodian sex workers fell through because of demands to provide the participants
health care following the conclusion of the research); see also The Participants in the
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trial access, the technology, once testing is completed, will be made
commercially available to benefit patients in richer countries. 16 Yet
the basic problem of access after research participation ends is not
limited to international studies. Domestic research subjects also
may face quite limited access opportunities post-trial.
In an attempt to address the neglect of post-trial access dis
putes, this Article undertakes a critical review of the key legal, ethi
cal, and policy issues that arise. The Article purposefully avoids
making definitive conclusions about whether and when to accom
modate subjects' demands for expanded post-trial access. Instead,
it aims to provide a more complete, balanced, and nuanced frame
work for thinking about post-trial access claims, and to highlight the
difficult questions that will likely emerge for health law and policy.
Part I briefly explains what drives research subjects' access de
mands, discusses representative post-trial access disputes, and ex
plains how investigators and sponsors have considerable discretion
to limit subjects' post-trial access to investigational technology.
Part II reviews how current law and ethics guidance is sufficiently
"grey," often offering unclear direction regarding what obligations
are owed to subjects at the end of the study. Part III analyzes, at a
more theoretical level, the primary legal and ethical arguments, as
well as policy considerations, for offering subjects greater post-trial
access to investigational technology. This section also considers im
portant reasons for rejecting such access demands. Part IV advo
cates moving beyond the status quo-where subjects generally have
weak rights to post-trial access-yet suggests an incremental reform
approach that is sensitive to the dangers and possible counter
productive effects of unbounded post-trial access. It offers two pre
liminary suggestions to help move in this direction: (1) more
required regulatory review of plans and budgets for post-trial access
before clinical trial protocols are approved; and (2) providing sub
jects, in certain situations, other benefits as an alternative to contin
ued access to the study technology.
2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, Moral Stan
dards for Research in Developing Countries: From "Reasonable Availability" to "Fair
Benefits", HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2004, at 17 [hereinafter Moral Standards

for Research in Developing Countries].
16. See, e.g., Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to
Reduce Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing
Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853 (1997) (discussing HIV trials); Moral Standards
for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 1515, at 24-26 (discussing clinical tri
als of Havrix, a hepatitis A vaccine, in northern Thailand).
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POST-TRIAL ACCESS-WHAT DRIVES THESE DISPUTES
AND REPRESENTATIVE CASES

A.

Access Demands and Expectations of Research Subjects

Research subjects certainly deserve praise and respect for vol
unteering for experiments that contribute to the progress of medi
cal knowledge and likely help future patients more than themselves.
But the altruistic aspect of research participation should not be
overstated. Subjects volunteer for trials for a variety of complex
reasons. Apart from altruism, subjects may enroll in clinical trials
because of a sense of hopelessness, general optimism about new
technology and medical innovation, or a seeming need to take ac
tion rather than face their illness more passively through only com
fort care and monitoringP Quite clearly, some degree of self
interest may be involved as well. Participation in medical research
enables subjects to enjoy access to investigational technology per
ceived as cutting-edge, the best available, or the last shot at improv
ing their health.
Access concerns of subjects may be acute because of the lim
ited opportunities patients have to receive investigational technol
ogy outside of clinical trials. Consider, again, the example of
experimental medication. FDA rules allow investigational new
drugs to be prescribed, in applicable situations, for treatment pur
poses (so-called "treatment INDs").ls FDA procedures also allow
for accelerated approval of certain drugs and biological products
used to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses. 19 Nonetheless, ac
17. See Nancy E. Kass & Jeremy Sugarman, Trust: The Fragile Foundation of
Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP., SEPT.-Ocr. 1996, AT
25; David T. Stern, Future Challenges From the U.S. Perspective: Trust as the Key To
Clinical Research, 15 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 87, 88-89 (2004).
18. See Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)
(2008). The regulations generally allow treatment use of an investigational new drug if:
(1) the medication will be used to treat a "serious or immediately life-threatening dis
ease"; (2) "no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy" is available;
(3) the drug is being tested in a controlled clinical trial or all trials have concluded; and
(4) the sponsor "is actively pursuing marketing approval" for the drug (i.e., the sponsor
is taking the necessary regulatory steps in order to offer the drug on the market for
regular clinical care). Id.
19. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500-.510, 601.40-.41 (allowing for fast-track approval of
drugs and biological products providing meaningful therapeutic benefit compared to
existing treatments); see also Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and
Drug Administration's Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have
They Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503 (1995).
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cess through these channels remains quite narrow. 20 In the recent
Abigail Alliance litigation, plaintiffs challenged FDA rules that gen
erally prevent access to Phase I drugs 21 if the patient is not partici
pating in or eligible for a clinical trial.2 2 The eventual en banc
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the FDA's restricted access rules did not
violate constitutionally protected liberty interests of terminally ill
patients. 23 Although the FDA won the case, the agency has been
developing its own proposal to expand access to unapproved
drugs. 24 Yet, even under the new agency approach, access to inves
tigational drugs for patients not participating in clinical trials will
likely remain limited. 25
Reimbursement issues further influence access demands of re
search subjects. In a clinical trial, the study technology is typically
paid for by the trial sponsor. 26 Also, subjects in clinical trials are
20. The FDA rarely allows treatment INDs and when allowed, this access is typi
cally only for drugs undergoing later stages of clinical trial testing (Phase III trials or
after). See Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved
Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316 (2007). For an explanation of the differing phases of
clin.ical trial testing, see note 2121 infra. Even for drugs involving immediately Iife
threatening diseases, the FDA has generally restricted INDs to drugs that have already
completed Phase I testing. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a).
21. Investigational new drugs typically undergo different phases of clinical trial
testing. Phase I studies establish levels of tolerance to determine safe dosage levels.
The typical Phase I study involves a small group of subjects (in the range of twenty to
eighty) compared to later phase trials. If deemed nontoxic, a drug passes into Phase II,
where it is tested to demonstrate efficacy and relative safety. Phase III studies involve
expanded controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials and further, more comprehensive
evaluations of efficacy and safety. See 21 c.F.R. § 312.21.
22. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
23. Id. at 713.
24. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,147 (Food & Drug Admin. Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
25. For example, under the FDA's new proposal, expanded access outside of a
clinical trial is available only after the FDA determines that there is no comparable or
satisfactory alternative therapy. Also, the FDA must determine that expanded access
outside of a clinical trial does not impede the ability to enroll subjects in research stud
ies needed to further evaluate the technology for efficacy and safety. See id. at 75,150
151. Further, it is not clear whether sponsors will have strong enough incentives to
offer their experimental drugs outside of clinical trials given the potential costs involved
and the complications that expanded access can create regarding sponsors' ability to
conduct further clinical trial testing. See, e.g., Judy Vale, Note, Expanding Expanded
Access: How the Food and Drug Administration Can Achieve Better Access to Experi
mental Drugs For Severely III Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2160 (2008).
26. See Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, For the Uninsured, Drug Trials Are
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,1999, at Al (explaining that drug trials are particu
larly attractive to the uninsured because of the chance to obtain free treatment).
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monitored for the accrual of study data and so enjoy more regular
contact with health care providers and more opportunities for ancil
lary health care that the sponsor may also pay for. 27 Thus, patients
lacking good (or any) health insurance may look to continued
clinical trial participation as a way to obtain coverage for basic
health care services, let alone investigational technology.28
In addition, powerful advocacy groups, including organizations
for persons with HIV/AIDS and breast cancer, have influenced
public perceptions about medical research, likely fueling research
subjects' access demands. These groups have lobbied vigorously for
increased research opportunities and for loosening the perceived ri
gidity on clinical trial eligibility.29 Unfortunately, these groups may
also be conveying unrealistic expectations of benefits from investi
gational technology, while glossing over the inherent risks of using
experimental interventions. 30

B.

Recent Representative Disputes

In recent litigation, subjects' post-trial access claims have met
with very limited success. It appears that investigators, and particu
larly trial sponsors, enjoy considerable discretion in offering sub
jects access to the investigational technology after the research is
over.
1.

The Amgen Cases

The recent litigation involving the pharmaceutical company
Amgen demonstrates this pattern. 31 Amgen sponsored multicenter
studies of an investigational drug for treating Parkinson's Disease.
27. See generally Roger Brownsword, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Re
searchers: Reasonable But Not Great Expectations, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 679 (2007).
28. See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 2626; see also Grady, supra note 1515,
at 435 ("If patients everywhere had better access to needed treatments, continued ac
cess to treatment at the end of a trial would be primarily a temporary issue. Research is
only one way of contributing to improved access to health care.").
29. See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PA
TIENT ADVOCACY AND RESEARCH ETHICS (2001).
30. See id. at 58-60 ("Advocacy literature often refers to investigational agents
and procedures as 'new treatments' and calls studies on terminal conditions 'life saving
research.' The possibility that research interventions might prove ineffective or more
risky than standard therapy is seldom broached. Instead, advocates equate clinical tri
als and medical treatment. ").
31. See Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen,
Inc. (Suthers /I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ruling on motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (preliminary injunction ruling).
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The study medication, a synthetic protein called glial cell line
derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF), was tested in a series of
Phase I and Phase II studies, beginning in 2000-2001, at different
medical centers around the country. Amgen had strong hopes for
commercializing GDNF after having acquired the biotechnology
company that initially developed it in a multimillion dollar acquisi
tion. But the initial trial results proved disappointing. Some sub
jects showed improvement in mobility, but not by large enough
degrees to be statistically significant. Meanwhile, safety concerns
emerged. Monitoring revealed that some subjects had developed
neutralizing antibodies that could attack naturally occurring GDNF
in their bodies and could make their conditions worse. Also, brain
lesions and related potential neurotoxic responses were found in
primates undergoing animal studies of GDNF. In 2004, Amgen an
nounced that it would end all clinical trials of GDNF. Amgen
based this decision on safety concerns combined with an apparent
lack of efficacy shown in the trial results. The FDA stated that it
would allow Amgen to continue to provide the drug post-trial to
certain subjects under its limited "compassionate use" program. 32
But the agency also said the decision to do so was up to Amgen,
and Amgen declined.
Some subjects were fiercely convinced that the study drug
worked and wanted to continue taking it notwithstanding the new
safety concerns. 33 Individuals enrolled in multicenter studies at
New York University Medical Center and the University of Ken
tucky Medical Center brought separate federal lawsuits against the
pharmaceutical company, seeking to compel Amgen to continue
providing them access to GDNF.34 Each lawsuit asserted nearly
identical legal claims: breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
breach of fiduciary duty. Both the Southern District Court of New
York (Suthers v. Amgen, Inc.)35 and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (Abney v. Amgen, Inc.)36 ruled against the SUbjects.
32. Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 423. Under "compassionate use" programs, the
FDA gives special approval for a drug not approved for any use to be administered to a
limited number of patients with serious and life-threatening illnesses. See id. at 423 n.6;
Benjamin R. Rossen, FDA's Proposed Regulations to Expand Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use: The Status Quo in the Guise of Reform, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
183, 194 (2009).
33. Abney, 443 F.3d at 544-45; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
34. Abney, 443 F.3d at 545; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
35. Slithers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
36. Abney, 443 F.3d at 553.
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Both of the Amgen courts followed very similar reasoning in
finding that the subjects had properly been denied post-trial access.
Several plaintiffs argued that they had been promised in the in
formed consent documents that they could elect to continue with
GDNF for another twenty-four months at the study's conclusion. 37
Several plaintiffs further contended that an investigator had made
representations that if the treatment was at all successful, Amgen
would keep them on the drug for an indefinite period. 38 Yet both
courts rejected the breach of contract claims, finding that Amgen
did not enter into any contract with the subjects. 39 The courts rea
soned that the informed consent document was between the univer
sities/investigators and the subjects, while the contract for
conducting the research (a distinct Clinical Trial Agreement) was
entered into between the universities/investigators and Amgen.40
In this complex web of contractual relationships, there were, impor
tantly, no direct agreements between Amgen and the subjects, and
so the subjects' breach of contract claims against Amgen failed. 41
Similarly, the courts held that any promissory estoppel claims
could not succeed against Amgen. 42 The courts found that Amgen
made no direct promises to the subjects. All enrollment discussions
were between the investigators and the subjects and did not include
Amgen. The courts further indicated that even if a contract or en
forceable promise had been formed between Amgen and the sub
jects, the informed consent documents and Clinical Trial
Agreements did not make an unconditional promise to provide the
study drug ad infinitum. 43 Instead, these documents informed sub
jects that the study could be terminated at any time by notice from
Amgen and that the study could be terminated for scientific rea
sons, such as the safety and efficacy issues asserted by Amgen.44
Both courts likewise rejected the claims that Amgen had a fi
duciary duty to provide a potentially beneficial study drug to the
37. Id. at 544.
38. See Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25.
39. Abney, 443 F.3d at 548-49; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26.
40. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 547; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
41. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547-49; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424-26; see also Vi
nion v. Amgen, Inc. 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th CiT. 2008) (affirming dismissal of breach of
contract claim and various agency claims against Amgen for failing to provide the study
drug following termination of the clinical trial).
42. Abney, 443 F.3d at 550; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
43. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547 n.5; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
44. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547 n.5; Slithers 1,372 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
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subjects. 45 The courts found no special duties arising between
Amgen and the trial subjects. The courts reasoned that the trial
sponsor stood in an indirect position too far removed from the sub
jects to have formed a fiduciary relationship with them.46
The Amgen cases illustrate the difficulties that subjects have in
asserting cognizable legal claims, especially against trial sponsors,
for post-trial access. It remains unclear whether the subjects' claims
failed primarily because Amgen had serious safety and efficacy rea
sons for denying continued access. Some of the principal investiga
tors at different research sites vigorously disagreed with Amgen's
conclusions and wanted to continue the trial or implement some
form of compassionate use for enrolled subjects. 47 It is also not
clear to what extent the safety and efficacy issues raised by Amgen
were a pretext for the sponsor's more bottom-line financial reasons
for terminating the study. The plaintiffs claimed that Amgen sim
ply decided to terminate the trials because GDNF was not likely to
turn a profit. 48 The plaintiffs contended that Amgen might have
been concerned about diminishing revenue margins because its pat
ent on the drug was soon to expire, only a limited number of pa
tients would likely use the drug because of the invasive means used
to deliver it, and the drug had a short shelf life. 49 Nonetheless,
Amgen vigorously denied that it had decided to end the studies pri
marily due to financial reasons. 50 However, as a doctrinal matter,
given the courts' views that the trial sponsor had no clear contrac
tual obligations or fiduciary duties to the subjects, it is highly debat
able what constraints the courts would have been willing to impose,
if any, on Amgen's ability to terminate the study and block contin
ued access abruptly, even if the trial sponsor lacked valid safety and
efficacy reasons.
2.

Other Representative Disputes

Clinical trial testing often yields data that is neither clearly pos
itive nor clearly negative. Instead, the results suggest that the in
vestigational technology offers limited efficacy, marginal
improvement, or, at best, performs no worse than existing treat
ments. Such ambiguous data can be interpreted very differently by
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Abney, 443 F.3d at 550; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
See Abney, 443 F.3d at 550-51; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426-29 & n.9.
See, e.g., Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
See Abney, 443 F.3d at 545.
Id.
Id.
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stakeholders with distinct agendas. Not surprisingly, trials involving
ambiguous study results frequently lead to post-trial access con
flicts. These tensions were evident in Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin
University, litigation involving subjects who had participated in a
longstanding breast cancer vaccine study at Rosalind Franklin Uni
versity of Medicine and Science (Chicago Medical School).51 The
subjects alleged that the medical school improperly terminated the
investigation.52 Among other claims, they contended that the con
sent forms and oral representations made by the researchers indi
cated that the vaccine treatment would be continued ad infinitum.
The study's initial principal investigator, Dr. Georg Springer, died
in 1998 and left a bequest to Chicago Medical School, allegedly to
help continue funding the study. However, in 2004, the University
terminated the study after its Institutional Review Board (IRB)
raised efficacy concerns that the data was too inconclusive to show
if the vaccine worked. 53 The University IRB determined that it was
not in the subjects' best interests to continue with such unproven
therapy.54
Yet many subjects, enrolled in the trial for years, felt the vac
cine had clearly benefited them and firmly wanted to continue with
it. 55 The plaintiffs included women with stage three breast cancer
whose advanced disease stages likely precluded them from many
other clinical trial opportunities and for whom standard treatments
offered little promise. 56 The lawsuit alleged breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, common law fraud, and
negligence, among other countsY
The University eventually settled the case so there was no rul
ing on the merits.58 Although the settlement terms were confiden
51. Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 3783418, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2006).
52. Complaint, Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL
3783418 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2006) (on file with the author).
53. See Natasha Korecki, Women Go to Court for Breast Cancer Vaccine, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26,2004, at 12.
54. See id.
55. See id. (explaining that despite doubts about the vaccine's effectiveness, at
least one woman, Catherine Moloney, believed that she was alive today because of the
vaccine). Indeed, the lack of clear efficacy data was a longstanding problem with the
clinical trial. Specifically, the study's effectiveness was hard to establish because there
were no control groups. See id.
56. See Complaint, supra note 52.
57. See id.
58. Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 3783418, at *1
(N.D. II\. Dec. 20, 2006).
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tial, the University apparently agreed to fund a new vaccine
program for the women at another institution. 59 However, the set
tlement provided the subjects incomplete relief, and the victory was
somewhat empty in terms of vindicating their clear preferences for
continued post-trial access. 60 The settlement only called for the
University to help fund the study at another yet-to-be-named insti
tution, with no guarantee that another institution would actually
agree to take over a study involving a vaccine of already question
able efficacy.61 Also it was not clear after the passage of time if a
key ingredient for producing the vaccine was still readily available,
making transition of the vaccine study to another institution all the
more difficult. 62 The Pollack litigation reveals the difficult remedy
problems subjects can encounter in enforcing claims to post-trial
access.
Post-trial access disputes often result from poor planning by
the trial sponsors and investigators about what will happen when
the study concludes. For example, in a recent clinical trial of an
experimental vaccine to treat shingles, the study results demon
strated that subjects who received the study vaccine were far less
likely to develop shingles or long-lasting pain from the condition
than subjects who received a placebo. 63 Despite such strong evi
dence that the investigational technology worked, Merck, the drug
company sponsoring the trial, was unable to switch the placebo sub
jects over to the experimental vaccine when the trial concluded. 64
The drug maker did not have enough vaccine available for all sub
jects once the trial ended. 65 Indeed, it was unclear whether the pla
cebo subjects would ever have access before Merck received full
FDA approval for the vaccine. 66 This frustrated access occurred
59. See Nataska Korecki, Breast Cancer Vaccines Return With Settlement, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 6.
60. In 2006, a federal magistrate judge determined that the court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and vacated an earlier
order that acted to enforce a critical clause of the agreement. Pollack, 2006 WL
3783418, at *8. One plaintiff told the press, "[w]e wanted our vaccine, that was our
main thing." Korecki, supra note 59.
61. See Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 2868921, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2006), vacated, 2006 WL 3783418.
62. Kelly Field, Medical School Settles Allegations of Fraud, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Nov. 12, 2004, at A34.
63. Todd Ackerman, Promising Drug Test, Unfulfilled Promise, Hous. CHRON.,
June 15, 2005, at AI.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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even as the subjects alleged that they had been promised the vac
cine at the end of the trial if it was proven effective. 67 Although
Merck likely knew how many placebo subjects were participating
and could have anticipated their post-trial access demands, the trial
sponsor apparently did very little in the planning stages to address
this.68 Nor is it clear whether the IRBs that approved the shingle
vaccine protocol sufficiently considered and discussed Merck's lim
ited plans for post-trial access. 69

II.

PosT-TRIAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW
AND ETHICS GUIDANCE

As the representative disputes indicate, investigators and trial
sponsors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding when to termi
nate a clinical trial and whether to offer subjects any post-trial ac
cess to the investigational technology. Decisions about post-trial
access seem largely driven by clinical research norms and industry
practices. Current law and ethics guidance, unfortunately, offers lit
tle clear direction on these matters. In short, "[u]ntil recently, regu
lations and codes of research ethics have been silent about what
should happen at the conclusion of a clinical study."70
A.

Current Law
1.

Federal Research Regulations

The federal research regulations governing medical research
say very little regarding when a trial may be terminated and the
post-trial obligations to subjects that may arise. The regulations
also do very little to address the many possible adverse conse
quences arising from terminating a study.71 The informed consent
provisions require that subjects be told about "the expected dura
tion of the subject's participation"72 and reminded that they have
the ability to "discontinue participation at any time."73 Also, sub

67. Id.
6S. See id.
69. See id.
70. Grady, supra note 15, at 425.
71. See Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimen
tation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 3S ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 63, 131-32 (1993) (discussing proposed amendments to the regulations that
would clarify and remedy the current situation).
72. Elements of Informed Consent, 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(I) (200S); General Re
quirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(I) (200S).
73. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(S); 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a)(S).
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jects are to be informed of the "[a ]nticipated circumstances under
which the subject's participation may be terminated by the investi
gator without regard to the subject's consent,"74 but such informa
tion is to be disclosed only '.'when appropriate. "75
In any event, the regulations do not expressly require disclo
sure to subjects of detailed information about the myriad reasons
unrelated to safety, such as lack of financing or changed business
prospects, that may lead to discontinuation of the study and a de
nial of post-trial access. Indeed, in Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., some of
the informed consent documents simply stated that a subject might
be withdrawn from the clinical trial due to "termination or cancella
tion of the study by the sponsor. "76 Although this terse statement
placed no conditions or limitations on why the sponsor might be
allowed to terminate the trial, and did not even make clear that a
termination might still arise even if the technology was beneficial,
the court implicitly found that the narrow disclosure was suffi
cient.?7 The court relied on this statement to find that subjects were
adequately put on notice about the possibility of interrupted access
to the study medication. 78
Apart from informed consent, the federal research regulations
also require that most applicable clinical trial protocols obtain the
approval of an IRB before subjects can be enrolled in the study.79
Yet the regulations do not discuss in any detail to what extent IRBs
should consider post-trial access plans as part of their protocol re
view process or what IRBs should ask and require of sponsors and
investigators regarding post-trial access .
. Even if an IRB imposes post-trial access requirements as part
of its conditions for protocol approval, the requirements would be
difficult to monitor and enforce. IRBs may not even be able to
gather sufficient information and data on what is happening to the
subjects after the clinical trial is over to even become aware of a
brewing post-trial access dispute.
More importantly, IRBs simply have little authority or clear
jurisdiction to compel a sponsor or investigator to offer post-trial
access, or even to require that a trial be continued to a reasonable
74.
75.
76.
2006).
77.
78.
79.

21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 46.1l6(b)(2).
21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b); 45 C.F.R. § 46.1l6(b).
Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers II), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 485.
Id.
See 21 C.F.R. § 56.103; 45 C.F.R. § 46.109.
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stopping point before the sponsor or investigator can terminate it.
A sponsor or investigator can often unilaterally stop a trial simply
with adequate notice to the IRB. The IRB's enforcement powers at
that point are quite limited even if it becomes aware of problematic
conduct by the sponsor in blocking post-trial access. The IRB can
not terminate or withhold approval for a trial that has already
ended. It may only be able to deter sponsors indirectly by threaten
ing not to approve their future protocols at the institutions.
2.

Common Law Contract/Informed Consent

The traditional common law's general emphasis on individual
ism and self-reliance would suggest that subjects are free to decide
whether to enroll in trials that offer limited or no post-trial access to
investigational technology.80 Absent clear promises or contractual
obligations made to subjects about post-trial access, the common
law is unlikely to require it. 81
Yet proving the existence of express agreements or promises
about post-trial access can become difficult for subjects. First, there
is the question whether any binding contracts even exist in the med
ical research context. Although subjects sign written informed con
sent documents when enrolling in a study,82 some courts have been
reluctant to find binding contractual obligations in the research set
ting, treating the informed consent documents as merely notice of
the subjects' consent rather than an enforceable contract. 83
Even if viewed as contracts, the informed consent documents
typically are carefully worded to avoid express commitments to
post-trial access and yet to provide flexibility in allowing for when
and why the trial may be terminated. 84 Some sponsors do offer to
80. Cf Brownsword, supra note 27, at 687 (contrasting the classic common law
approach to contracts and torts, which focused on self-reliance and individualism, with
current approaches, which focus on reliance on others).
81. See, e.g., Vinion v. Amgen, Inc., 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming
a dismissal of a subject's breach of contract and tort claims against Amgen for failing to
provide the study drug following the termination of the clinical trial).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25; 45 c.F.R. § 46.116.
83. See, e.g., Harden v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr., No. 04AP-154, 2004 WL
2341713 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 19,2004). In Harden, the court rejected a subject's breach
of contract claim that the defendants had promised the subject medical care for life. Id.
at *6. The court reasoned that the informed consent document merely served as notice
of the subject's consent to the investigational procedure. [d. at *5. It was not a legally
binding contract involving bargained-for promises with sufficient consideration. [d. at
*7-8.
84. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 547 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Even if
the Informed Consent Document or the Clinical Trial Agreement created a contract
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provide continued post-trial access for a limited time after the trial
formally ends, but these developments are ad hoc rather than com
mon practice. 8s
Further complicating matters, as demonstrated in the Amgen
cases,86 is the fact that even if the informed consent document
makes express promises to subjects about post-trial access, the
sponsor is typically not a signatory to this document. Thus,
promises made in the informed consent document may not bind the
sponsor. Yet the sponsor, not the investigator or medical center,
usually controls access to the study technology, at least with pri
vately funded studies involving an external sponsor. It is especially
revealing that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir
cuit in Abney v. Amgen, Inc., although unwilling to find liability
against the defendant trial sponsor, nonetheless took the unusual
step in its opinion of openly lamenting the poor state of informed
consent about post-trial accessP The court called on parties not
even involved in the litigation (and therefore not subject to the
court's immediate jurisdiction) to work harder to ensure that sub
jects were better informed about what would happen at the end of a
clinical trial:
Moreover, the litigation in this case indicates that the University,
through its Informed Consent Document, and its other represen
tations to the plaintiffs did a poor job informing the plaintiffs as
to the grounds upon which the study would terminate and their
access to GDNF would be denied. We urge the University's In
stitutional Review Board, and other review boards throughout
the Circuit, to take additional measures to ensure that patients
fully understand that even if they or their physicians believe an
experimental treatment to be safe and efficacious there may be
circumstances under which they will be denied continued access
to treatment. If this fact had been properly explained to the
plaintiffs in this case prior to the outset of the clinical trial (and
between Amgen and the plaintiffs, Amgen would still have no duty to provide the
plaintiffs with [the drug] .... [T]he Clinical Trial Agreement specifically allowed Amgen
to terminate the agreement 'immediately upon written notice."'); supra note 76 and
accompanying text (discussing the Amgen informed consent document's phrasing on
when the trial could be terminated).
85. See Grady, supra note 15, at 429-30.
86. See Abney, 443 F.3d 540; Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers II), 441 F. Supp. 2d
478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1.
87. Abney, 443 F.3d at 551 n.6.
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spelled out clearly in the Informed Consent Document) perhaps
the litigation in this case could have been avoided. 88

The fact that the court took this extraordinary step of issuing
an open call urging change throughout the circuit regarding how
IRBs conduct their protocol reviews and what subjects are told
reveals the current limited reach of the common law. However
bothered the court may have been about Parkinson's Disease trial
subjects' possible misunderstanding and detrimental reliance on a
belief that they could continue with GDNF, the court was unable to
find the informed consent problems actionable against Amgen, the
actual defendant in the case. 89 Amgen was not a party to the In
formed Consent Document and did not enroll the subjects, yet as
the trial sponsor it controlled access to the technology.90
3.

Unclear Legal Duties in the Investigator-Subject
Relationship and Limited Duties Between
Sponsors and Subjects

A further reason that the law provides unclear direction as to
any post-trial access obligations owed to research subjects is be
cause the more general duties of care that are owed to research
subjects remain legally uncertain. The common law views many as
pects of the physician-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature and
often imposes heightened duties of care and loyalty on the physi
cian. 91 But fiduciary principles may not apply to the investigator

88. Id.
89. [d. at 55l.
90. It should be noted that despite the court's implied suggestion that the plain
tiffs' real grievance was with the investigators and the University, not the sponsor
Amgen, even an informed consent claim against these other parties would likely run
into problems. Even if misleading statements about post-trial access were made, for a
viable informed consent claim to succeed, plaintiffs would typically have to prove the
additional elements of causation and damages. In other words, plaintiffs would have to
show that any negligent information disclosure caused them tangible, physical harm.
This proof can be especially hard for research subjects to satisfy. Often in a medical
study the technology in question is investigational and its risks and benefits are still
largely unknown, making it quite speculative and difficult to prove through litigation
that deprived access to the investigational technology made subjects therapeutically
worse off. See generally Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U.
ON. L. REV. 941, 963-65 (2006).
91. Even in regular doctor-patient relationships, courts have found physicians lia
ble for breach of fiduciary duty in only limited scenarios, such as failure to secure in
formed consent or to maintain confidentiality. See Maxwell 1. Mehlman, Fiduciary
Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51
U. PITT. L. REv. 365,401-14 (1990) (finding inconsistency in how courts apply fiduciary
principles to different health care relationships); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fidu
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subject relationship. The classic fiduciary has undivided loyalty to
and acts in the best interest of the principal.92 But an investigator
cannot have undivided loyalty to and always act in the best interest
of the subject. 93 The protocol will demand that consistent study
procedures be followed in order to yield generalizable data. This
limits the ability of the investigator to provide individually tailored
care and to act solely in the best interest of the subject. 94 Also, the
principal aim of a study is to benefit future patients, not the imme
diate subject, through the knowledge gained. Because of the re
searcher's experimentation goals rather than clinical care focus, the
principal-investigator relationship fits quite awkwardly into the fi
duciary framework. 95
On the other hand, some commentators urge imposing full fi
duciary or fiduciary-like duties upon investigators. 96 The relation
ship between investigator and subject features power and
informational asymmetries, the vulnerability and potential for ex
ploitation by one party, conflicts of interest affecting the more pow
erful party, and significant trust, dependence, and expectations of
confidence. These factors are typically found in fiduciary relation
ships and arguably support requiring investigators to meet height
ened duties of care and loyalty to subjects. 97
ciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care
System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 247-S1 (199S) (discussing the application of fiduciary
standards to physicians).
92. See Rodwin, supra note 91, at 243 ("The law defines a fiduciary as a person
entrusted with power or property to be used for the benefit of another and legally held
to the highest standard of conduct.").
93. See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at AI. Dr. David S. Schimm is quoted as stating: "'What the
patients are not seeing is that the clinical investigator is really a dual agent with divided
loyalties between the patient and the pharmaceutical company.'" Id.
94. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
10 (2d ed. 1986) ("The deprivation of the experimentation ordinarily done to enhance
the well-being of a patient is one of the burdens imposed on the patient-subject ....").
9S. See E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: Discarding a
Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS S86 (200S). Indeed, in the first Suthers v.
Amgen, Inc. case, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in finding
that the trial sponsor had no fiduciary duties, questioned whether even the investigators
or academic medical centers with more direct connection to research subjects had clear
fiduciary duties to the subjects. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers /), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416,
427 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 200S).
96. See, e.g., Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 14, at 109-10; Angela R. Holder,
Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?, IRB: ETHICS & HUM.
RES., Jan. 1982, at 6.
97. See Holder, supra note 96; see also Coleman, supra note 14, at 431-32.
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A somewhat in-between position urges application of a "partial
entrustment" model to the investigator-subject relationship.98
Under this view, investigators have special responsibilities toward
subjects because subjects have given investigators permission to ac
cess and collect confidential health information, perform tests, ob
tain samples, and undertake other procedures. Investigators enjoy
considerable discretionary power because of this grant of permis
sion. Subjects are seen as partially entrusting their health to investi
gators, suggesting that investigators have accompanying
responsibilities for the subjects' health. 99 These duties of care may
not be as strong as those in the ordinary doctor-patient relationship
but should involve some limited responsibilities to protect subjects
from harm.loo
While academic commentators have supported the partial en
trustment model,101 it has yet to be clearly adopted in the limited
case law involving medical research. Indeed, there is very little in
the way of controlling precedent that helps determine the legal na
ture of the investigator-subject relationship.102 Thus, the question
remains whether researchers and subjects are in a classic fiduciary
relationship, a quasi-fiduciary relationship, a special relationship,
fall under the partial entrustment model, or are simply parties inter
acting at arms length. Because the individualized care and loyalty
obligations that investigators may owe to subjects are not well de
fined, understandable confusion exists about whether the investiga
tor has any duty to ensure a subject's post-trial access to the
investigational technology.

98. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsi
bilities of Medical Researchers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.·Feb. 2004, at 25, 27.
99. See id. at 27-32.
100. See id. at 28.
101. See, e.g., id.
102. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d 807, 849-52 (Md. 2001),
which involved research on lead-paint abatement in homes rented to families with chil
dren, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the researchers had heightened obliga
tions toward the subjects. The court's reasoning, however, remains ambiguous as it
identified several possible sources for imposing heightened obligations, including the
"special relationship" that might exist between researcher and subject, the special
quasi-contract between the parties established by the informed consent document, du
ties derived from the federal research regulations, and duties implied from international
ethics standards such as the Nuremberg Code. See id. Thus, Grimes does not provide
clear answers to whether an investigator has heightened obligations premised solely on
special relationship/fiduciary duty theories. Moreover, Grimes has not been widely fol
lowed to date.
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As for trial sponsors, existing precedent suggests that the du
ties that sponsors owe to subjects are quite narrow and perhaps
even more limited than the duties that investigators owe subjects.
Recall that in both Amgen cases the courts were unwilling to find
that the trial sponsor had a fiduciary relationship with the subjects
that triggered heightened duties of care.103 The courts reasoned
that the sponsor had no contact with the subjects and imposing a
fiduciary duty would be inconsistent with sponsors' loyalties to the
protocol as a whole and their need to maintain sufficient distance to
pursue legitimate research ends.104 Moreover, a sponsor, even
more than an investigator, has more plainly apparent loyalties to
the scientific protocol. Thus, the fiduciary paradigm of undivided
loyalty to subjects seems particularly ill-fitting when applied to the
trial sponsor.
B.

Ethics Guidance

Current ethics guidance similarly remains underdeveloped.
Closest on point is the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the
World Medical Association (WMA).105 As revised by the WMA in
2008, the Helsinki Declaration now states that "[a]t the conclusion
of the study, patients entered into the study are entitled ... to share
any benefits that result from it, for example, access to interventions
identified as beneficial in the study or to other appropriate care or
benefits."lo6 In 2004, after much debate over an earlier provision
regarding post-trial access, the WMA issued a clarification stating
that it was
reaffirm[ing] its position that it is necessary during the study
planning process to identify post-trial access by study participants
to prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures identified
as beneficial in the study or access to other appropriate care.
Post-trial access arrangements or other care must be de
scribed in the study protocol so the ethical review committee may
consider such arrangements during its review.107
103. Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen,
Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
104. Abney, 443 F.3d at 550-551; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426-29.
105. See WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS <j[ 33 (2008), http://
www.wma.netle/policy/pdfl17c.pdf [hereinafter WMA Ethical Principles].
106. Id.
107. See Press Release, World Medical Association, Clarification on Declaration
of Helsinki (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.wma.netle/press/2004_24.htm.
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The Declaration of Helsinki revisions were undertaken in re
sponse to concerns about international HIV trials and exploitation
of subjects in developing countries. lOS Many of the subjects, be
cause of cost barriers and limited sponsor plans for distribution,
were unlikely to receive the investigational technologies once they
were approved for commercial use in the United States and other
developed countries. Yet these subjects bore much of the risk of
clinical trial testing. 109
The revisions to the Declaration of Helsinki appropriately
highlight the importance of anticipating post-trial access needs of
research subjects. 110 Further, the Declaration revisions implicitly
recognize that it is inequitable and ethically troubling to deny sub
jects access to beneficial study technology at the end of a trial when
their efforts involved risk and were critical for generating the re
search data that demonstrated the technology's efficacy. Nonethe
less, the Declaration revisions unfortunately leave many important
questions unanswered.
First, what level of benefit must a study technology offer to
trigger an ethical obligation of ensuring that subjects have post-trial
access? The Declaration states the obligation as only to offer sub
jects access to interventions "identified as beneficial in the
study."l1l But many clinical trials fail to generate data that unam
biguously shows that the study technology offers clear improvement
over existing treatments. Instead, the data can be murky. Is there
still a strong ethical obligation to provide willing subjects continued
access to investigational technology shown to be only marginally
more effective than existing treatments? What if the technology re
quires further stages of testing before issues of comparative benefit
can be more definitively resolved? Do subjects who participated in
now completed trials still have a meritorious claim to post-trial ac
cess pending further testing? Indeed, for such reasons, the Declara
tion of Helsinki's provisions become particularly hard to apply to
early stages of clinical trial testing such as Phase I studies that pri

108. See Press Release, World Medical Association, WMA to Continue Discus
sion on Declaration of Helsinki (Sept. 14, 2003), http://www.wma.netJe/press/2003_19.
htm.
109. See Editorial, One Standard, Not Two, 362 LANCET 1005 (2003); MORAL
STANDARDS FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 15.
110. See WMA Ethical Principles, supra note 105.
111. Id. 'II 33.
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marily evaluate toxicity, not efficacy,l12 After a technology has
completed Phase I testing, or even after limited Phase II trials,
there still may not be enough useful data generated to determine
whether the "identified as beneficial in the study" standard applies
and triggers a post-trial access obligation.
Second, if there is a legitimate claim by subjects for post-trial
access, must access be offered for unlimited duration? It is possible
that subjects may want to continue with investigational technology
long after the study has ended, especially for treatment of chronic
diseases. Does the case for continued post-trial access weaken over
time? Third, the Declaration of Helsinki has very little to say about
who has the responsibility to ensure that a subject has post-trial ac
cess-the investigator, the sponsor, the academic medical center
where the research is conducted? Or is the responsibility shared
jointly?
Apart from the Declaration of Helsinki, other ethical guidance
on post-trial access remains quite limited. For example, the Inter
national Ethical Guidelines of the Council for International Organi
zations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) initially advised that agencies
sponsoring medical research "should agree in advance ... that any
product developed through such research will be made reasonably
available to the inhabitants of the host community or country
[where the research is conducted] at the completion of successful
testing."l13 A 2002 clarification extends this obligation to sponsors
and investigators in situations where the research will be conducted
in a population or community with limited resources and requires
that the product "or knowledge generated" from the trial be made
reasonably available after the study's conclusion.1l4 Yet this gui
dance offers little direction on important details. For example,
much of the guidance concerns making the technology available to
the community where the research was conducted.l 15 Does this
mean that residents in the community who did not participate in the
112. See Michelle M. Mello & Steven Joffe, Compact Versus Contract-Industry
Sponsors' Obligations to Their Research Subjects, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2737, 2740
(2007).
113. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORG. OF MED. SCI. (CIOMS) & WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(WHO), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLV
ING HUMAN SUBJECTS 45 (1993).
114. See COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORG. OF MED. SCI. (CIOMS) & WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (WHO), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN
VOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, at Guideline 10 & crnt. (2002), available at www.ciorns.ch/
frarne....guidelines_nov _2002.htrn.
115. See id.
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research should have the same degree of post-trial access as the ac
tual subjects? Is that fair to the subjects who actually participated
and incurred direct risks? More importantly, it remains unclear
under the CIOMS guidelines how much benefit an investigational
technology must offer in order to trigger any post-trial access
obligations.
III.

WHY REQUIRE POST-TRIAL ACCESS?

Is it even clear that subjects should enjoy special access post
trial to investigational technology? This section reviews primary ar
guments for and against expanded post-trial access. It aims to map
out the key issues and provide a balanced, more nuanced frame
work for thinking about post-trial access disputes moving forward.

A.

Reasons for Expanded Post- Trial Access

An initial reason to provide subjects with greater post-trial ac
cess is because this is what many subjects expect. Of course, not all
expectations are reasonable and not all expectations lead to legally
cognizable claims. But subjects' expectations of post-trial access,
although often inaccurate, may be quite foreseeable and reasonable
given the overall context. As noted, many consent forms fail to ap
prise subjects in sufficient detail of the likelihood of and reasons for
study termination and subsequent denied access to the investiga
tional technology, save for terse boilerplate statements that allow
the subject to be withdrawn upon "termination or cancellation of
the study by the sponsor."116 Meanwhile, well-documented thera
peutic misconception problems mean that many subjects already
have difficulty distinguishing between experimentation and ordi
nary medical care. 117 Some subjects falsely believe that when they
enroll in a trial, they will receive customary and proven treatment
tailored to their individual condition. Conflation by subjects of reg
116. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers /I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
117. See Paul S. Appelbaum et aI., Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Re
search: Frequency and Risk Factors, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 1
(discussing the common misconceptions associated with clinical research); Sam Horng
& Christine Grady, Misunderstanding in Clinical Research: Distinguishing Therapeutic
Misconception, Therapeutic Misestimation, & Therapeutic Optimism, IRB: ETHICS &
HUM. RES., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 11, 12-13 (same).
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ular clinical care and medical research continues to be a recurring
problem. lIS
Accordingly, it can be expected that many subjects will not pay
due attention to the salient aspects of a clinical trial that distinguish
it from ordinary medical care, including, importantly, how the un
derlying relationship with the health care professional terminates
and what happens afterward. Some subjects, influenced by thera
peutic misconception, may think that a clinical relationship will con
tinue so long as they benefit from participation in the study, similar
to how an individual physician ordinarily continues to treat her pa
tient through the whole episode of an illness. Subjects may not
fully understand that they can be dropped from a study protocol or
that the experiment itself can be terminated in an entirely different
manner than a physician terminates a patient from his clinical prac
tice. Similarly, many subjects are likely not aware of the complex
web of medical research relationships and contracts that typically
exist between the trial sponsors, the investigators, and the academic
medical centers. Accordingly, they may not sufficiently appreciate
the lesson of the Amgen cases: a promise by the investigator in a
consent form to provide post-trial access to investigational technol
ogy may be unenforceable because the sponsor, who is not a party
to the consent form, usually controls access. 119
In short, many subjects may not anticipate how tenuous their
post-trial access opportunities are when deciding to participate in a
clinical trial. This raises significant concerns about the adequacy of
the consent. It also suggests detrimental reliance by subjects that is
foreseeable to investigators and sponsors, raising possible promis
sory estoppel concerns. When there is likely confusion about what
happens at the end of the clinical trial, limiting post-trial access may
manipulate and play upon subjects' desperate, uncritical access de
mands. It seems cruel and inappropriate to invite subjects to enroll
in a trial and ask them to invest significant personal resources in
participating without better addressing the possibility that their le
gitimate access concerns will be frustrated and disrupted when the
trial concludes.
Apart from informed consent and promissory estoppel issues,
legal obligations to provide post-trial access may also arise from the
118. See Appelbaum et a1., supra note 117, at 1. See generally Franklin G. Miller
& Donald Rosenstein, The Therapeutic Orientation to Clinical Trials, 348 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1383 (2003) (reviewing various factors that contribute to conflation).
119. See Mello & Joffe, supra note 112, at 2741; see also supra Part I.B.1.
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investigator-subject relationship. As previously noted, the legal pa
rameters of this relationship and whether it imposes any special du
ties of care or loyalty upon investigators remain subject to
continued debate. 12o To the extent that the relationship could be
viewed under the partial entrustment model,121 subjects may have
stronger claims against investigators to ensure broader post-trial ac
cess. An investigator's limited responsibilities for the subject's
health under the partial entrustment model could extend to ensur
ing post-trial access to beneficial technology for some reasonable
duration. Alternatively, if the investigator-subject relationship is
viewed as a fiduciary or even quasi-fiduciary relationship, then the
law should police abuses of trust in the relationship as it does in
other fiduciary contexts. One way to strengthen the fiduciary
bonds, preserve trust, and protect subject welfare would be to im
pose some obligation on the investigator to ensure post-trial access.
Another related concern is whether denying subjects post-trial
access is legally actionable abandonment. In ordinary medical care,
once a physician enters into a treatment relationship with the pa
tient, the physician has a legal duty not to abandon the patient.1 22
This duty is breached when the physician unilaterally ends the
treatment relationship without providing reasonable notice, and
when medical necessity requires continued treatment of the pa
tient. 123 The duty of nonabandonment may be thought of as a nec
essary corollary to and part of the general duty of care arising under
the doctor-patient relationship or arising from the fiduciary aspects
of the doctor-patient relationship.124 Abandonment in regular
clinical settings has typically been actionable as ordinary medical
malpractice. 125
Of course it remains debatable whether a legal duty of nona
bandonment should apply with equal force, or at all, to the investi
gator-subject relationship as it does to the doctor-patient
120. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
122. See Church v. Perales, 39 S.w.3d 149, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ("While the
physician-patient relationship exists, the physician has a duty to continue providing
care.").
123. See, e.g., id.; King v. Fisher, 918 S.w.2d 108, 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Many
jurisdictions provide that the treatment relationship may be terminated after appropri
ate notice to the patient. See Jackson v. Okla. Mem'l Hosp., 909 P.2d 765, 774 & n.38
(Okla. 1995). Far less clear is whether the physician, to fulfill the duty of nonabandon
ment, must also actively transition the patient to alternative care.
124. See Rodwin, supra note 91, at 247-48; see also supra text accompanying note
91.
125. See King, 918 S.W.2d at 111.
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relationship. As noted, investigators conducting research do not
necessarily assume the same robust duties of care and fiduciary ob
ligations that arise for physicians treating individual patients. Simi
larly, investigators might not be held to the same nonabandonment
obligations as physicians. But if the doctrinal justification for im
posing strict nonabandonment duties on investigators is unclear, ad
dressing abandonment hazards in the research context remains
important, nonetheless, for compelling ethical and policy reasons.
Blocking access to investigational technology after the trial con
cludes arguably treats subjects as mere experimental devices to be
discarded after use. This violates general ethical principles that
stress the need to treat subjects with dignity and respect as autono
mous persons. 126 Put another way, "[a]bandoning participants at
the end of a study, when their useful 'life' to the researchers and
sponsor is over, is fiendish."127 Ethical (and possibly legal) duties
to subjects, however vague and ill-defined, at least should include a
commitment to protecting subject welfare,128 and not abruptly jet
tisoning subjects or losing sight of their interests as soon as they are
no longer needed to complete the researchY9 Flagrant abandon
ment conduct, if undeterred, also can create significant distrust by
research subjects. The larger research enterprise depends on trust
by subjects to function,130 while endemic distrust seriously under
mines the ability to recruit subjects for future studies. l3l
Ethical (if not legal) considerations of reciprocity and social
contract also support expanding post-trial access opportunities for
subjects. Subjects enroll in trials with generally unclear opportuni
ties for therapeutic improvement because the benefits of investiga
tional technology remain largely unknown pending further
research.B 2 Yet, investigators and sponsors could not complete
their work and gather needed research data without the effort of
sUbjects. Arguably, the investigators and sponsors owe something
back-some form of reciprocal responsibilities or benefits-to the
126. See LEVINE, supra note 94, at 15-16.
127. Editorial, supra note 109, at 1005 (discussing limited post-trial access of sub
jects in the context of research conducted in the developing world).
128. This minimal commitment can be found under the federal research regula
tions. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b )(1) (2008) (requiring institutions to file assurances
detailing their commitment to "protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects").
129. See Grady, supra note 15, at 430-31; Saver, supra note 90, at 1004.
130. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trl/St, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470-71
(2002); GaUer, supra note 14, at 356-57.
131. See GaUer, supra note 14, at 356.
132. See discussion supra Introduction.
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subjects to acknowledge, honor, and reinforce these altruistic as
pects of participating in medical research. 133 Similarly, society as a
whole arguably owes something back to subjects for undertaking
risks in order to advance medical progress for the good of the popu
lation. 134 Reciprocal obligations suggest that there should be
greater concern about subjects' general status and ongoing health
post-trial. These considerations likewise may support reform mea
sures to ensure that subjects enjoy post-trial access to beneficial in
vestigational technology.
B.

Problems with Expanded Post- Trial Access

At the same time, a closer examination of the legal and ethical
issues suggests that expanding post-trial access is not always neces
sary or warranted. Moreover, mandating some form of post-trial
access rights for subjects introduces new concerns and may prove
counterproductive for health policy. First, reciprocity arguments of
owing subjects something back as justification for expanded post
trial access, while ethically appealing, may be overstated. If sub
jects deserve some form of post-trial access due to their research
participation efforts, does that diminish legitimate access demands
of other stakeholders? For example, it is not clear that participating
subjects deserve preferential access when access opportunities may
still be foreclosed to other patients. 135 Patients with the same type
of illness as the research subjects could also benefit from access to
the investigational technology once a clinical trial ends. But these
similarly situated patients may have no opportunity to receive the
technology because it is not commercially available until further
clinical trials are concluded and they may not even be eligible for
participation in the new studies.
More generally, a sponsor may only be able to accommodate a
limited number of individuals seeking post-trial access while the
technology undergoes further testing in subsequent studies. In such
circumstances, an ethical presumption, translated into a regulatory
directive, that trial participants should enjoy post-trial access could
133. Cf Brownsword, supra note 27, at 680 (discussing reciprocity obligations to
provide subjects with ancillary care during the course of a clinical trial); Jennifer L.
Gold & David M. Studdert, Clinical Trial Registries: A Reform That is Past Due, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 811, 815 (2005) (discussing the research enterprise as a form of social
contract).
134. See Grady, supra note 15, at 430.
135. See Maria Merritt & Christine Grady, Reciprocity and Post-Trial Access for
Participants in Antiretroviral Therapy Trials, 20 AIDS 1791, 1792 (2006).
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mean that the subjects in reality have preferred and exclusive access
compared to other patients. Reciprocity concerns of owing some
thing back to subjects do not necessarily support displacing other
patients also in need and postponing their opportunities for thera
peutic improvement. In trying to reward subjects with reciprocal
benefits, it is important not to impose disproportionate burdens on
other patients by further impeding or delaying their access.136
Second, as with reciprocity, concerns about abandonment do
not necessarily support robustly expanding subjects' post-trial ac
cess. Because the investigator's duty of care to subjects may be
more limited than the duty that arises in the ordinary physician
patient relationship, and the investigator does not undertake to pro
vide individualized care,137 nonabandonment restrictions seemingly
should apply with less force in the research context than in ordinary
clinical care. Arguably, the investigator's primary duties to the sub
ject end when the protocol is carried out faithfully to its stopping
point. Much of the conduct that defines the investigator-subject re
lationship has already ended upon the suspension of research activi
ties at the protocol's conclusion. After that, there is little, if any,
continuing research relationship to speak of. Hence, any accompa
nying duty of nonabandonment should also diminish because the
essential research activities that were at the heart of the relation
ship are already coming to an end. While investigators may have an
obligation to let subjects down easily and respectfully at the end of
a trial, it is not clear that abandonment concerns require that a sub
ject's access to investigational technology be continued when the
investigator-subject relationship terminates.
Moreover, even in the ordinary doctor-patient relationship,
nonabandonment obligations are not unlimited and abandonment
concerns do not justify imposing a duty on physicians to continue
all forms of personalized care that may be responsive to the pa
tient's circumstances.13 8 The traditional common law approach is
quite flexible and supportive of physicians seeking to end a treat
ment relationship with a patient. So long as the physician gives
proper notice to the patient that the treating relationship will end,
generally the cessation of care is not actionable, even if the physi

136. Id.
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
138. See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Nonabandonment: An Old Obligation Re
visited, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 377 (1995).
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cian has no clear reason for the termination of care. 139 Accord
ingly, investigators might simply minimize any abandonment
concerns by giving proper notice to subjects when all study-related
activity will end. Also, some jurisdictions recognize abandonment
claims only if the termination of care occurs when the patient is at a
critical stage or in need of immediate medical attention. 140 Not all
subjects at the end of a clinical trial will even be able to meet such
criteria. Their continuing medical concerns may be quite personally
important, but their clinical conditions are nonetheless not in a suf
ficiently acute stage.
Third, expanded post-trial access is not necessarily the appro
priate remedy for the problems at hand. As noted, post-trial access
disputes raise serious concerns, among other issues, of informed
consent and therapeutic misconception problems. 141 Claims that
subjects have been misled and even exploited underlie many of
these disputes. 142 They may not fully appreciate how tenuous their
post-trial access opportunities are, both because of their confusion
about the differences between research and individualized care and
their general desire to access investigational technology. But, if
true, is the essential harm that needs remedying exploitation or de
ception? The distinction matters in terms of possible responses. If
subject deception becomes the principle area of concern, then the
usual regulatory response to deception is to require more accurate
and complete disclosure going forward. Thus, to the extent that de
ception is the problem, requiring additional benefits post-trial (in
cluding the benefit of post-trial access) is not the obvious regulatory
solution. 143
Fourth, requiring increased post-trial access may simply exac
erbate rather than appropriately address therapeutic misconception
problems. Subjects in a clinical trial may be convinced that an in
vestigational technology is ordinary clinical care precisely because it
has been offered to them post-trial. Yet the particular trial that just
concluded may have represented only a partial assessment of the
technology, and the technology may require further evaluation
139. Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV.
511, 529 (1997).
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp., 508 A.2d 927, 929 (D.e. 1986);
Surgical Consultants, P.e. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
141. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen,
Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
142. See, e.g., Abney, 443 F.3d 540; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d 416.
143. See Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 15, at
19.
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before firmer conclusions can be drawn about its appropriate use in
regular clinical care.
Fifth, even if subjects deserve greater post-trial access, it is im
portant to impose acceptable boundaries. Not all post-trial access
claims will be equally valid, and the force of any right to post-trial
access will likely vary depending on a number of context-specific
factors. For example, even if the partial entrustment model or fidu
ciary law concepts are applied to the investigator-subject relation
ship, post-trial access claims under either approach would likely
strengthen depending on a subject's increasing degree of vulnerabil
ity and dependency and the more significant information and re
sources that the subject entrusts to the researcher. In contrast, a
subject's post-trial access claims should arguably weaken when it
still remains uncertain post-study whether the investigational tech
nology offers a clear benefit or significant improvement over ex
isting alternatives. Indeed, the general ethical principle of
beneficence 144 does not mean that subjects are owed the same de
gree of post-trial access for all clinical trials. The more ambiguous
the efficacy data associated with investigational technology, the less
clear the subject's welfare will be negatively affected by blocked
access, and, accordingly, the weaker a subject's claim to post-trial
technology necessarily becomes. 145 Denying subjects post-trial ac
cess in situations of unclear efficacy or unclear comparative advan
tages seems less an act of abandonment or failure to honor duties of
care and loyalty and more the prudent and necessary allocation of
limited resources. Some subjects' post-trial access demands may re
flect sheer desperation. It does not help the research enterprise
generally, or increase trust in medical research, if subjects can com
pel the continuation of access to investigational technology as they
see fit, regardless of a more objective weighing of efficacy and
safety issues and other larger interests at stake.
Related to the problem of imposing clear boundaries on when
subjects can invoke a right to post-trial access is the need to develop
144. The principle of beneficence in the research setting recognizes the impor
tance of helping subjects while avoiding the imposition of harm. The beneficence prin
ciple requires that the risks associated with research be reasonable in light of the
expected benefits, and that all possible benefits be maximized and the chance of harm
minimized. See TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 260 (4th ed. 1994).
145. See Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care Obliga
tions, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 256, 268 (2008) (making a similar point for the related
issue of when the research team should provide ancillary care during the trial).
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a better understanding of how much access is appropriate. 146 Must
investigators or sponsors provide the study technology ad infin
itum? Does the length of post-trial access depend on whether the
study was terminated for lack of efficacy or even for safety con
cerns? Should post-trial access be required only while the study
technology awaits full regulatory approval and before it becomes
commercially available? If the technology earns full regulatory ap
proval but the subject still cannot afford the technology or obtain
insurance coverage for it, must the investigator or sponsor pay for
the subjects' continued access?
Expanded post-trial access also introduces new problems and
may have negative implications for health policy. Requiring
sponsors or investigators to ensure subjects' post-trial access will
increase transaction costs for clinical trials, potentially over-deter
ring beneficial research and limiting the number and kind of studies
pursued. Insisting on post-trial access across the board runs the risk
of paternalism and disrespect for subject autonomy by interfering
with the decisions of individuals who might rationally choose to en
roll in trials with limited or no post-trial access rather than forego
important research opportunities altogether. The chilling effect of
required post-trial access may prove particularly problematic in
communities with limited availability to existing health care
services. Researchers and sponsors will be especially wary of con
ducting research in such areas in order to avoid being encumbered
by many post-trial access claims. The additional costs required to
support greater post-trial access might also mean that limited
research dollars are diverted away from new studies and toward
ensuring post-trial access to investigational technology, even tech
nology that seemingly offers only marginal benefit.
Also, sponsors and investigators have valid concerns that ex
panded post-trial access will expose them to greater risk of liabil
ityJ47 A clinical trial differs from ordinary clinical care in the
degree of monitoring involved. When the clinical trial is underway,
and its protocol followed, monitoring procedures are in place to
collect data, identify safety issues, and evaluate subjects' progress in
a systematic way, including the continuing review of ongoing stud
ies performed by IRBs and, when applicable, data safety monitor
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. Cf Talbott, supra note 20, at 318 (discussing related liability concerns for
sponsors and investigators with increasing access to unapproved drugs outside of a for
mal study).
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ing boards. But when the clinical trial ends, these formal
monitoring procedures often end as well. Offering subjects contin
ued access to investigational technology without more comprehen
sive monitoring in place runs the risk of the development of
unanticipated hazards. In addition, investigators may be more vul
nerable to post-trial claims that they failed to tailor medical treat
ment for each patient as needed. For example, a subject might
argue that his clinical condition required changed dosage levels in
the experimental medication or a different type of screening test. If
this occurred while the trial was underway, the investigator could
more easily defend against such negligence claims by arguing that
the protocol in place required that the investigator follow standard
ized procedures for all subjects in order to develop generalizable
research data for the study. Yet post-trial, such defenses may not
succeed because there is no longer a clear need to follow the
protocol.
Finally, and particularly pertinent to this Symposium's theme
of the complicated connection between technology regulation and
technology reimbursement, regulatory mandates to expand post
trial access could have negative and confounding reimbursement ef
fects. Governmental and private payers look to the results of
clinical trials as part of their assessment process to determine when
to selectively reimburse new technologies. But if subjects are rec
ognized as having more robust rights to post-trial access, this could
lead to slippery slope problems and inevitable pressures, from both
subjects and non-subjects, for payers to cover investigational tech
nologies sooner and more broadly. For example, if subjects of a
recently completed Phase III trial of an experimental cancer drug,
now just approved by the FDA, can readily command continued
post-trial access to the medication, other patients with the same
condition will increasingly lobby (or even litigate for) their health
plans to cover it. Payers may have a harder time restricting cover
age for other patients on grounds that the technology is noncus
tomary or not reasonably necessary when a large group of subjects
is receiving the technology. Much attention will likely be focused
on anecdotal reports of success that subjects experience with the
drug post-trial. But any such data, seized upon by stakeholders
seeking greater coverage for all patients, will almost certainly have
less statistical and predictive significance than data gathered while
the subjects were on the protocol because of the lack of standard
ized procedures once the study has ended. Indeed, for legitimate
reasons, payers might prefer to restrict reimbursement for the re
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cently approved technology until more significant studies assessing
its cost-effectiveness can be performed. It is important for compre
hensive technology assessments to be conducted before widespread
coverage decisions are made; otherwise, expensive new technology
will further strain limited health care resources.
Along the same lines, expanded post-trial access may compli
cate the ultimate conduct of the underlying study and skew the re
search findings. A regulatory approach that mandates expanded
post-trial access invites strategic gamesmanship by certain subjects
to terminate the trial early. Subjects in blinded, randomized studies
usually do not know whether they are receiving the experimental
intervention or the standard treatment to which it is being com
pared,148 Subjects most concerned about access to investigational
technology would realize that, while the trial was underway, they
only have a possible but not guaranteed chance of receiving the in
vestigational technology due to randomization procedures. But if
all subjects enjoy a right to post-trial access, each subject's access
chances actually increase when the study concludes. Accordingly,
subjects might advocate for early study terminations-or even
make continuation of the research difficult for investigators-to
trigger a trial termination and actually increase their access chances.
The possibility of additional early trial terminations is of consider
able concern for health policy. It is important to carry clinical trials
to statistically significant stopping points to ensure that the result
ing data can better resolve clinical uncertainty and more effectively
guide future health care treatment, reimbursement, and allocation
decisions. 149
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Providing detailed reform recommendations is beyond this Ar
ticle's scope. Instead, the focus has been on critically reviewing the
competing considerations at play in post-trial access disputes and
identifying the important questions emerging for health law and
policy. However, the status quo certainly needs improvement.
Representative disputes, such as the Amgen cases,lS0 indicate that
investigators and, particularly, trial sponsors enjoy considerable dis
cretion in rejecting often legitimate and foreseeable post-trial ac
148. See Menikoff. supra note 8, at 63.
149. See Stuart J. Pocock, When to Stop a Clinical Trial, 305
(1992).
150. See supra Part I.B.1.
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cess demands of subjects, which raises many problems. 151 The
challenge is how to navigate an incremental reform approach that
offers some improvement over the status quo yet minimizes the
dangers of post-trial access completely unbound. In that spirit, this
section recommends two preliminary strategies.
A.

More Focused Regulatory Review of Post- Trial Plans and a
Presumption of Some Post- Trial Access

Greater transparency about what will happen post-trial would
certainly help address concerns that subjects are being misled or
even exploited because of their post-trial access expectations. As
noted, informed consent documents sometimes provide only brief
statements about the possibility of study termination or early inter
ruption and do not usually provide detailed information about post
trial access to the study technology. The federal research regula
tions should require that informed consent documents, in order to
secure IRB approval, provide complete disclosures to subjects
about when and why the study could be terminated. Also, in
formed consent documents should be required to have a distinct
section that identifies what plans, if any, exist to provide the study
technology to subjects after the trial, including, importantly, who
will pay for this access. If there are no plans for continued access,
the informed consent document should be required to explain that
fact expressly and conspicuously, including statements that subjects
will have no guarantee of post-trial access even if the technology
improves their condition.
IRBs can only properly insist upon and monitor such disclo
sures in the informed consent documents if they do a better job of
protocol review in the first place and ferret out what the plans are
with respect to post-trial access. 152 As previously noted, the IRB
review regulations at present do not provide sufficiently detailed
instructions to IRBs as to what to look for in protocol applications
regarding post-trial conduct. 153 Recent post-trial access disputes
disturbingly suggest that IRBs have approved studies with minimal
inquiry regarding post-trial plans. These cases also suggest that
sponsors and investigators did not make sufficient transition plans
151. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v.
Amgen, Inc. (Suthers 11), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Suthers v.
Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
152. See, e.g., Amgen, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
153. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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or even budget for the likelihood that subjects would want post-trial
access. 154
To assist IRBs in monitoring these issues, the federal research
regulations should require that protocol applications document in
greater detail what will happen when the study ends, including the
possibility that the study may be terminated early because of per
ceived lack of efficacy. This documentation should also make clear,
for the IRB's consideration and approval, the decision-making pro
cess to be followed by the sponsor or investigator for determining
whether the trial results show enough benefit to justify continuing
post-trial access. The application could include descriptions of the
criteria to be considered and statistical guidelines to be used.
Apart from transparency problems, the post-trial needs of sub
jects seemingly exert only a weak influence at best on sponsor and
investigator decision making at the end of a study. This lack of con
sideration of subjects' access preferences has led to poor balancing
of stakeholder interests and continual conflict. One approach to
prod sponsors and investigators to consider subjects' access de
mands more consistently is through regulatory presumptions favor
ing some form of access. The federal research regulations might,
for example, state that investigators and sponsors will be expected
to provide subjects with some form of post-trial access when the
trial is stopped for reasons other than safety. This default obliga
tion could only be varied if the initial protocol contains a request to
modify this obligation, along with justification from the sponsor or
investigator that explains why no special access is warranted, and
the IRB approves this variance. A related presumptive approach
would make it a regulatory requirement that protocols, in order to
receive IRB approval, include assistance programs that help sub
jects with maintaining post-trial access for a limited duration, such
as one year after the study, similar to what some pharmaceutical
companies already do on a limited basis in particular clinical tri
als. 155 This requirement could be waivable for good cause by the
IRB.
A presumptive approach avoids making post-trial access an
overly burdensome, open-ended obligation for sponsors and inves
tigators. Instead, it is more likely to result in a finite commitment
from the sponsor or investigator that would be time-limited and
154. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing post-trial planning
and supply problems in the Merck shingles vaccine study).
155. See Grady, supra note IS, at 429.
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that could be anticipated and budgeted for in the planning process
for developing the study. Also, a presumptive approach has suffi
cient flexibility and recognizes that in some clinical trials, such as
where the technology offers limited efficacy, continuing post-trial
access may not be warranted and can be waived for good cause by
the IRB.
B.

Benefits Other than Post- Trial Access

Another promising strategy, presently underutilized, is to offer
subjects other benefits as an alternative to post-trial access to the
investigational technology. For example, instead of post-trial ac
cess, subjects could deem it a sufficient reciprocal benefit that their
community experiences advantages from the research because
health care professionals in the area receive special training as part
of the clinical trial.1 56 Or subjects might receive more personal al
ternative benefits, such as the opportunity to receive screening and
primary health services not required under the protocol. All of
these can be very real gains to subjects. Reciprocity and gratitude
considerations suggest that subjects should receive something fair in
exchange for what they have undertaken for society'S benefit, not
necessarily a specific claim to any particular benefit.1 57
Alternative benefits have the advantage of being less burden
some for sponsors and investigators, avoiding some of the chilling
deterrent effects that might arise with required post-trial access.
Alternative benefits can also avoid some of the implementation
problems that arise with post-trial access, such as how much access
is enough and whether it needs to be continued indefinitely. Alter
native benefits may be more predictable, measured more consis
tently, and valued more highly than differing degrees of post-trial
access. For example, Phase I drug trials evaluate primarily toxicity,
not efficacy, of the experimental medicine. Mandating that subjects
have post-trial access to the study medication after a Phase I trial
can make things unduly complicated and difficult. A drug that has
only cleared Phase I testing may still be produced in limited sup
plies because Phase I testing typically occurs with a smaller group
of subjects than later testing phases. 15s More importantly, many ba
sic efficacy questions about the drug remain, including what dosage
156. See MORAL STANDARDS FOR RESEARCH
note 15, at 20.
157. See id. at 19-2l.
158. See 21 c.F.R. § 312.21(a)(I), (b) (2008).
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to use and on what schedule, because the medication has not been
comprehensively tested yet for efficacy. In such situations, alterna
tive benefits may be much easier to implement and the benefit to
subjects more clearly understood. 159
Greater use of alternative benefits also directly responds to the
remedy gaps identified in litigation over post-trial access. Recall
that in the Amgen cases allegedly misleading promises by the inves
tigators about post-trial access were not binding on the trial spon
sor-the party that controlled access to the experimental drug
because the sponsor was not a party to the informed consent docu
ments. 160 This disconnect between what the investigator may prom
ise and what actions may be brought against the sponsor to enforce
access leaves subjects with incomplete remedies and without ade
quate recourse in response to potentially deceptive or misleading
disclosures about post-trial access. Yet many alternative benefits,
such as offering additional health services, are within the more di
rect control of the investigators. Subjects could more easily enforce
promises of alternative benefits against investigators, and providing
alternative benefits may be a more flexible way for investigators to
discharge any obligations owed to subjects.
CONCLUSION

Post-trial access disputes deserve greater regulatory and schol
arly attention because of the challenging questions raised for health
law and policy. Sponsors and investigators currently have consider
able discretion to restrict post-trial access to investigational technol
ogy. Yet regularly blocking access undermines notions of
protecting subject welfare, disrupts subjects' foreseeable and often
legitimate expectations, and raises concerns of abandonment,
among other problems. At the same time, closer examination of
the legal and ethical justifications suggests that post-trial access is
not always necessary or warranted. Subjects' access demands may
be uncritical and clouded by therapeutic misconception; indeed,
there are often valid reasons for restricting access. Further, the in
vestigator'S post-trial obligations to subjects are not necessarily
equivalent to the continuing treatment duties that physicians owe to
patients in ordinary clinical care. Thus, it is important to consider
159.

See Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 15, at

160.

See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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incremental reform approaches that avoid the problems of un
bounded post-trial access.
A critically needed next step is to develop regulatory standards
that provide more transparency to subjects and more upfront dis
closure to IRBs about post-trial access plans before protocols are
approved and subjects are enrolled. Other possible reforms worth
exploring include regulatory presumptions favoring some form of
time-limited, post-trial access, waivable by an IRB for good cause.
Complementary to these regulatory changes, greater consideration
should be given to offering subjects alternative benefits to contin
ued access. However, these are only preliminary strategies. Much
important work remains to be done to delineate more clearly the
obligations owed to subjects at the end of a clinical trial as well as to
implement policies that can better avoid post-trial access conflicts
from first developing.

